Shedding Light on Non-Financial Risks – a European Survey

Shedding Light on Non-Financial Risks – a European Survey — January 2012

7. Appendix

Table 8.1.10: Country group average of stringency for professional vs retail investors [1] [2] [3]

[4]

[5]

Full sample mean

0.01

-0.12

-0.56

-0.24

-0.05

Group 0 diff-to-mean (RoE)

0.06

0

0.2

0.09

0.07

Group 1 diff-to-mean (Fr)

-0.01

-0.14

-0.31 ***

-0.09

-0.12

Group 2 diff-to-mean (UK)

0.2

0.07

0.22

0.02

0.16

Group 3 diff-to-mean (Ge+Au+Nl)

0.17

-0.05

-0.26

0.05

-0.12

Group 4 diff-to-mean (Lux+Irl)

-0.4 **

0.17

-0.01

-0.11

-0.04

ANOVA F 0.53 * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. “Fr” is France, “UK” is the United Kingdom, “Ge+Au+Nl” is Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, “Lux+Irl” is Luxembourg and Ireland, and “RoE” is the rest of Europe. Answers are coded in the following manner: -2 for Greatly lower towards professional investors, -1 for Slightly lower, 0 for Neutral, 1 for Slightly higher, 2 for Greatly higher towards professional investors. [1] Transparency, information and governance [2] Financial responsibility of the industry [3] Regulation on distribution [4] Stricter obligations of restitution [5] Judicial powers to investors 1.24 0.33 1.33 0.25

Table 8.1.11: Country group average of net cost of regulation for asset managers [1] [2] [3]

[4]

[5]

Full sample mean

-0.66

-0.84

-0.63

-0.42

-0.74

Group 0 diff-to-mean (RoE)

-0.02

-0.03

-0.02

0

0.11

Group 1 diff-to-mean (Fr)

0

0.03

0.03

0.33 **

-0.1

Group 2 diff-to-mean (UK)

0.36 ***

0.29

0.13

-0.33

0.04

Group 3 diff-to-mean (Ge+Au+Nl)

-0.05

-0.22

0.04

0.01

0.02

Group 4 diff-to-mean (Lux+Irl)

-0.25

-0.07

-0.14

-0.17

-0.13

ANOVA F 0.48 * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. “Fr” is France, “UK” is the United Kingdom, “Ge+Au+Nl” is Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, “Lux+Irl” is Luxembourg and Ireland, and “RoE” is the rest of Europe. Answers are coded in the following manner: -2 for High net cost, -1 for Net cost, 0 for Neutral, 1 for Net benefit, 2 for High net benefit. [1] Transparency, information and governance [2] Financial responsibility of the industry [3] Regulation on distribution [4] Stricter obligations of restitution [5] On aggregate 1.01 0.74 0.29 1.56

Table 8.1.12: Country group average of net cost of regulation for depositaries [1] [2] [3]

[4]

[5]

Full sample mean

-0.43

-0.62

-0.29

-0.85

-0.71

Group 0 diff-to-mean (RoE)

0.07

0.04

-0.07

0.11

0.15

Group 1 diff-to-mean (Fr)

0.03

0.07

0.14

-0.21

-0.13

Group 2 diff-to-mean (UK)

0.03

0.22

-0.06

0.05

0.06

Group 3 diff-to-mean (De+Au+Nl)

-0.04

-0.2

0.12

0.14

-0.07

Group 4 diff-to-mean (Lux+Irl)

-0.21

-0.24

-0.11

-0.06

-0.12

ANOVA F 0.9 * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. “Fr” is France, “UK” is the United Kingdom, “Ge+Au+Nl” is Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, “Lux+Irl” is Luxembourg and Ireland, and “RoE” is the rest of Europe. Answers are coded in the following manner: -2 for High net cost, -1 for Net cost, 0 for Neutral, 1 for Net benefit, 2 for High net benefit. [1] Transparency, information and governance [2] Financial responsibility of the industry [3] Regulation on distribution [4] Stricter obligations of restitution [5] On aggregate 0.43 1.05 0.73 0.77

87

An EDHEC-Risk Institute Publication